S.P. T.R. 181 mores and customs. And this difference is further emphasized by their historical careers and in these latter years by their political divergences. These divergences go so far that they sometimes result in a rupture of all of the ties of kinship. The representatives of the intellectual class among the Ukrainians are unwilling to consider themselves as Russians, as a nation of the same origin and of the same character as the Russians. They tear the unity of the Russian world into two segments, into two nations: the one located to the north is made upof the Great Russians, the Russians Kat'eksokhln, /among the foreigners/ otherwise called Rossiani, the Moskali or the Moskvichi. The others, the people of the south, are the Little Russians, the Yugorusi (1), or, /51/ according

1. Russians of the south.

to a more recent appellation, the Ukrainians.

S.P. T.R. 101 Up until now there is no agreement as to the names to be used. The Great Russians and the foreigners, conforming to tradition, most frequently use the expressions: Great Russians, Little Russians, bearing in mind the historic name of Little Russia (excepting Galicia and Vladimir). The appellation of Iugorusi is less frequently encountered (for example in Pypin and in Kostomarov). The Little Russians do not care for these two names and forsome time have preferred that of Ukrainians. The Galicians employ the term Rusin with the adjective 'ruski' opposed to Rossianin, 'rossisky' for the Great Russians. This name has been adopted beyond the Russian borders, but it has not been accepted within them. The Gorals of Galicia willingly call themselves Rusniaks. The Germans, following the Latin, use the form 'Ruthenian' which also has been admitted into French. The conflicts between the two nationalities have engendered ironic and insulting appellations. Thus the Ukrainians call the Great Russians "Katsapy" (Goat-head, because of their beard) or Khazars, and the latter call the Ukrainians "Khokli" (from Khokhol, "top-knot," because of the manner in which the Cossacks formerly dressed their hair).

S.P. T.R. 578 186

Thus there is conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. This interesting conflict has very old and quite /52/natural causes. The differentiation between the Russians of the north and of the south occurred a long time ago; it has developed little by little, but without pause. Furthermore, there have been grievances and misunderstandings for a very long time between Great Russia and the Ukraine, and their entire life has been completely distinct throughout

S.P. T.R. 577 186

centuries. However, formerly the conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, did not exist in its present day sense. On the contrary, the two parts had a sense of kinship, or even of unity, as may be seen in an examination of the motives for which Bohdan Khmelnitskyj gave himself to Moscow and to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich (in 1653), after detaching the Ukraine from Poland.

S.P. T.R. 577 668

The conflict[1] between the two Russian nations did not in fact break out until the Nineteenth Century.

Its basic causes were:

1. The efforts of the Ukrainians to create or to revive a language and a literature of their own.

2. A whole series of scientific discussions upon the question as to what were the connections between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, especially from a linguistic and an anthropological viewpoint.

Finally and above all:

3. The actual political and social status of the Ukrainians in the Empire and the general development in these latter years of social and democratic ideas.

/53/ Thus today the conflict is moving more and more from the literary and scientific field into the political field.

S.P. T.R. 577 668 538

The conflict began in 1798, when J.P. Kotljarevs'kji published in Ukrainian his Aeneid. From that date on there has been a great effort to create an indigenous literature. But these tendencies were quickly opposed by the government, which feared that this literary separatism might be prejudicial to national unity. And upon various occasions, especially in 1847, 1863, and 1876, it was forbidden to print or publish, save for a few rare exceptions, books in Ukrainian. But the result of these prohibitions was completely opposite from that which was intended. The tendencies toward literary emancipation asserted themselves so much the more strongly as they were more rigorously suppressed, and they found favorable soil in eastern Galicia, which belongs, as we know, to Austria.

S.P. T.R. 197 314 829

On the other hand, the conflict[1], strengthened by the scientific discussions concerning the ties between the two nations, became aggravated. There were arguments about the antiquity of the Ukrainian idiom, especially in the Kiyev region, about the question of

1 A [Between Great Russians and Ukrainians, ch. 2, 11, #35-37. Ar...]

1: Niederle--39 E-5 1911 Slavic Peoples E1C
Tsarist Russia R2

S.P. T.R. 814 829 and led to the following conclusion: Of the two nationalities only one, that of the Ukrainians, is purely Slav; the peoples who live to the north and to the east of the Dvina and the Dnepr are not Slavs, but Finns, Tatars, or Turani more or less affected by Slavic influences, whose entire organization, and whose absolutist government in particular, are Asiatic in origin and character.

This conclusion, which the inventors of the theory of the two nationalities had scarcely suspected, found favorable soil, in particular among the Polish victims of the ill-omened revolution of 1863. And it was through their emigration that the doctrine of the two Russias, the one Slavic, the other Turanian, was propagated. Among the propagators of this doctrine, let us mention only the /56/ names of Dushinskii and of his wife Severina Duchinska, of Buszczynski and of the French historian Henri Martin. (1)

1. Several times I have had the opportunity of expressing myself on these theories and on the misuse which Dushinskii and his disciples claim has been made of them. See especially La Revue des Cours letteraires (year 1868) and my Souvenirs d'um Slavophile (pp. 20-25, Paris, Hachette, 1905). Translator.

This theory did not find as favorable soil among the Ukrainians; S.P. T.R. [186] but it has been accepted in various ways, and it explains to us the epithet, Khazars, (2) which is sometimes given to the Great Russians;

2. The Khazars, formerly Kozares, a Scythian people according to the Russian Chronicle said to be by Nestor. See my translation of this chronicle (page 325). Translator.

this epithet apparently came from completely inaccurate ideas as to S.P. T.R. 144 829 the origin of the Great Russians. The anthropologists have treated the question in a more scientific manner by indicating the considerable differences which exist between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians are for the most part brachycephalic and of dark complexion, while the Great Russians are generally of light complexion; at the same time it is demonstrated that dark brachycephalic type is the pure Slavic type (Volkov, Taylor). But this theory, although it has a certain amount of data in its favor, cannot be considered as proven. There is another one, which considers the Belorussian and Great Russian type as the true type of the Slavs; and this theory has in its favor at least as many arguments to /57/ make it worthy of belief. And the differences that arise within each of the two groups

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I

p. 1

The Primitive Slavs

121 The object of this study is to provide a fairly detailed account of the Slavs from their first appearance in history to their emergence in modern times as a group of nations akin in race and language, but diversified by the cultural and political influences to which they have been exposed.

[16 1] Numerically the Slavs are the largest linguistic group in
131 Europe, including some two hundred million people. Located
175* in the eastern section of the European Continent, they were long remote from the civilization which grew up on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, and thus were late in assuming an active political role. In early medieval times their lack of organization made them an easy prey to nations of higher material culture and more intense political aspirations; consequently the hostility between German and Slav is a historical factor of long standing. The geographical situation of the Slavs not only set them as a natural bulwark against nomadic invaders from Asia, but also exposed them to Asiatic cultural influences and to the infusion of alien blood. Their very numbers and their remote habitations retarded their cultural advance, as did also the domination of the unenlightened mass by an intelligent minority touched in varying degree by foreign
•186 civilizations. Hence the absence of any pervasive tradition of
175* native culture has repeatedly prevented the development of

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ethnic or national self-consciousness and restricted the capacity of Slavic peoples either for self-government or for a resolute national effort in the critical moments of their evolution. Even those Slavs who live closest to the centers of European civilization and who shared its progress for centuries have often been debarred by economic and political factors from the enjoyment of a full national life, and those more distant from these centers have emerged from the Middle Ages only during the last 250 years. In the light of these facts, it is not surprising that the Slavs have often seemed an enigma to the Western world.

By virtue of their geographical distribution, the modern Slavs fall naturally into three distinct groups: Eastern, Western, and Southern. Of these, the Eastern is the most numerous. It embraces the Russians, who comprise two-thirds of the Slavic complex, and subdivide linguistically into three sections: first and most important, the so-called Great Russians, inhabiting the central and northern districts of European Russia; second, the White Russians (and here "White" has no political connotation whatever, but means light-haired) who occupy the area which borders on the northern part of the former eastern frontier of Poland, and, while centering in the neighborhood of Minsk, also run over into former Polish territory as far as Grodno, Bialystok, and Brest-Litovsk; and third, the so-called Little Russians (otherwise known as Ukrainians or Ruthenians), who inhabit the black-earth prairies or steppes north of the Black Sea from the western frontier to the Kuban and Don rivers. The Ukrainians, as present-day newspaper readers know only too well, also inhabit not only Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as far west as Przemysl, but also the extreme eastern tip of the former republic of Czechoslovakia, known as Subcarpathian Russia (now Soviet territory), and likewise make up a considerable part of the population of Bukovina (now also Soviet), an area which formerly belonged to Romania and which lies just south of the former Polish-Romanian frontier.

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III

Conversion and Religious Divisions

175* While conversion to Christianity was an inevitable phase of
• 186 the process by which the Slavs were drawn into the general
797 movement of European civilization, it was by no means an unmixed blessing. When Slavic tribes had evolved to some semblance of national consciousness and even statehood, or were sufficiently remote from the center where religious influence was exempt from political pressure, they were able to retain their independence and to follow a characteristic course of development. But if they lived on the periphery of a powerful and aggressive Christian state, their political independence was frequently threatened, and if this state cherished colonial aims, the convert Slavs were very likely to face the choice between assimilation and enslavement, or, at the very worst, complete extermination.

797 The section of the medieval church which brought about the
795 conversion was also a factor of durable historical weight. The
178 Western Church was devoted to the tradition of Latin culture.
779 It insisted on the celebration of the Mass in the hallowed
191 language of the Church. Hence it evinced little concern for the creation of any vernacular culture. Though not possessed of
175* the same vitality, the Eastern Church soon found that it could evangelize the various pagans on the long Byzantine frontier more effectively if it allowed them to use their native languages

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175* 643 631 was the husband of a Greek princess, and the son of this union eventually became the consort of Gytha, daughter of the Saxon Harold who fell at Hastings in 1066. Kiev was thus united with contemporary European states by a series of dynastic alliances foreshadowing the customs of modern times.

175* 643 Yet for all his power and wealth, Yaroslav governed by the same simple mechanism that had prevailed under Vladimir. The prince won his position by force and maintained it by personal supremacy, supported by Varangian mercenaries recruited from Scandinavia whenever domestic levies proved insufficient or disloyal, and consulting with his chief military aides, with the city elders, or with church dignitaries on matters of general [671] policy. Yaroslav began the codification of customary civil and [795] ecclesiastical law, encouraged both translations and original literature, and endeavored without success to emancipate the Russian Church from the Byzantine patriarchate. By his crushing victory over the nomad Pechenegs before the walls of Kiev in 1036, he made the marches of his principality safe for thirty-five years.

175* 643 346 532 Beside rebuilding his father's Church of the Tithe after it was damaged by fire in 1017, he carried out a large-scale construction program which made Kiev one of the most notable medieval cities. His great cathedral of ~~Saint~~ Sophia in Kiev, with its five apses and thirteen cupolas, still contains the largest extant yardage of eleventh-century Byzantine frescoes and a series of remarkably preserved mosaics of impressive beauty. This is the one medieval Russian church which has been exhaustively studied by American archaeologists in coöperation with native Russian colleagues.

175* 643 186 631 The underlying weakness of the Kievan principality lay in the fact that its stability was assured only by the prestige and ability of the ruling prince. There was as yet no sentiment of solidarity, national unity, and group interest which guaranteed that the whole system would not be overthrown by some ambitious and resolute rival from among the kindred princes in outlying cities loosely subject to the authority of the prince of Kiev and envious of his power and wealth.

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younger state in a volume which might have served as a firm basis for the development of a characteristic native culture. The Russians before the Tartar invasion were always pupils; they originated very little that was independent of Byzantine models either in literature or in art.

In art, however, this imitation was productive and created an architectural and a decorative tradition which lasted down into modern times. By the date of Vladimir's conversion, the basilica as a type of church architecture in Byzantium had been largely replaced by the cruciform church with one or with five cupolas. This was the type transmitted to Russia and still worthily represented by the great medieval churches of Kiev, Novgorod, Vladimir and even Moscow, though in the metropolis the more exotic forms and the onion-shaped dome derived from wooden architecture prevail. The highly conventionalized art of the icon dominated Russian painting until Western influences began to seep in during the seventeenth century, but this tradition was still vital enough before the first World War to influence the art of nineteenth-century religious and historical painters. For where the Byzantine tradition had taken firm root, the aesthetic appeal was long-lived and enduring.

In literature, along with lapidary works of religious implication, the Russian national spirit began to manifest itself in historical compilations during the eleventh century, and literary reflexes of folk poetry had already appeared before the Tartar conquest. But a truly national literature stems from a long educative process, and this process was interrupted in medieval Russia both by domestic politics and by nomadic inroads.

Where domestic disorders merely retarded the intellectual advance of medieval Russia, the Tartar incursion brought it to a full stop. It has already been noticed what material impoverishment it had caused. But the Tartar domination was a far more serious factor in the deterioration of cultural and spiritual values. The church, to be sure, was treated with tolerance by the Tartars because it preached submission to

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entrances in the old imperial days. Linguistic minorities which never even had alphabets, let alone schools, now have both. Their cultural representatives are hailed as contributors to the intellectual life of the nation, which has a chance of not remaining purely Slavic or European, but may instead draw new life and inspiration from the resident Asiatic and other alien stocks. The intermediate and elementary school system has been extended into the most remote districts, and in non-Slavic areas the native tongue has an equal chance with the official Russian.

The pressure of doctrine which long lay heavy on literature and art, however, has been intensified in recent years. The trend of the times is naturally in favor of a somewhat romantic and dogmatic picture of reality, since it would not be in the interest of the prevailing system to admit that its present imperfections are permanent departures from the ideal which has been set up. Present-day Soviet culture is intensely patriotic, not to say nationalistic. But of the great legacy of the nineteenth century surprisingly little has been lost. The classics are the models for present-day writers. But upon the accomplishment of the past have been grafted the materialistic aims of a new society which aims at a degree of organization and technical achievement which even the great progressives of the sixties would not have deemed possible. For though the autocracy of the Soviet State echoes more than once the spirit of the Muscovite Middle Ages and sometimes applies the methods of the Tartars for its self-preservation, the fact still remains that this autocracy is inwardly devoted to a program of national service, the execution of which we may only hope will not be too seriously hampered or interrupted by international factors and power politics which divert national energy and resources from domestic growth and construction to baser military ends.

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just as much to the building up of Bohemia as did the Czechs. 175*
Apart from the early conflicts by which Bohemia became a 177
German vassal, the colonists were brought into the country voluntarily by Bohemian princes and barons, and they could therefore hardly be regarded in our own time as an inferior element with restricted rights in an area to whose economic and cultural development they had been generously contributing for seven hundred years.

It is fair to observe, however, that internal conflict between 175*
Czech and German broke out at the time of the Hussite Wars 721
of the fifteenth century. The radical Hussites bitterly attacked 186
the German population, which was in the main composed of faithful Catholics, and even wiped out the entire German citizenry of numerous cities and towns, while such German residents who compounded with the Hussite extremists were subjected to a violent campaign of Czechization. The results of this epoch of conflict were catastrophic. Most of what the German element jointly with the Bohemian had built up in three centuries of faithful effort was destroyed in less than half a century during which the Czechs split with the Germans on account of their loyal Catholicism. The weakness of the Hussite movement was that, while doubtless promoting a healthy national spirit, it broke down the traditional contacts which in previous centuries had contributed appreciably to the advance of culture and to the international prestige of the nation. The succession to the Bohemian crown first passed to the house of Austria in 1437, and Bohemia subsequently remained under the sovereignty of the Hapsburgs uninterruptedly from 1526 to 1918. During this period of nearly three hundred years there was obviously little doubt of the dominance of German influence.

Before turning to early German relations with the rising 175*
Polish state, let us follow the fortunes of the Slavs who emi- 167
grated westward to the basin of the Elbe. While the burden of German colonization on the Danube front was carried by the Bavarians with some aid from the Franconians, the same

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and industry by German immigrants to Bohemia and Poland require no demonstration. By virtue of its close political association with western Europe, Bohemia was speedily drawn into European intellectual life, and as early as the thirteenth century Bohemian authors were reproducing in their own language the forms and content of German medieval literature. International culture was still more widely disseminated after the foundation of the University of Prague in 1348, and the Hussite movement produced a wave of intellectual activity which lasted until the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century.

Poland, because of its comparative remoteness and political instability, was not subject to the same cultural stimuli, and the services rendered by the German settlers in Polish territory were exclusively practical and materialistic. The influence of the Polish crown was never strong enough, nor were its holders cultured enough, to exert a civilizing influence comparable to that which radiated from Prague. Only in the sixteenth century do we meet with a striking development of Polish literature, and here the productive influences were more those of the Renaissance than specifically German, especially since local education was dominated by the Jesuits and strictly limited to the classical curriculum. While German economic influence was strong in both the great western Slavic states, it was Bohemia which profited the most from the absorption of German culture, and it was not until the seventeenth century that political events halted the intellectual advance so auspiciously begun.

Yet it was in Bohemia that the first seeds of a new Slavic racial consciousness sprouted early in the nineteenth century. The age of enlightenment had emphasized the ideals of humanity, tolerance, and culture, and these ideals were spread throughout the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by the reforms of Joseph II. As a matter of fact, the principle of nationality was first formulated by a German, for it was Goethe's great friend and mentor Johann Gottfried Herder, who declared that "the

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most natural state is a state inhabited by a single nation with a single national character." This principle provoked a grateful echo in the minds of several outstanding Bohemian scholars and patriots. An ex-Jesuit, Joseph Dubrovski, the founder of Slavic philology as a discipline, was the first modern Bohemian patriot of nationalistic stamp, and his works gave to the whole Bohemian literary movement a pan-Slavist direction. He condemned Germanization, but not the Germans, and sincerely believed the Slavs destined to become the bearers of a new civilization. Through Dubrovski, the Czechs began to feel themselves a part of the great Slavic community, and expected to find support for their national aspirations in the new conception of a Slavic civilization.

Contemporary with Dubrovski (who died in 1839) was Joseph Jungmann, translator of *Paradise Lost* and of Châteaubriand's *Atala* who, by his compilation of the first Czech dictionary, revealed the wealth of the mother tongue and by his studies in literary history disclosed the richness and diversity of prior Bohemian literature. Dubrovski's work was carried on by the great antiquarian Paul Joseph Šafařík, a Slovak by birth, whose studies of the origins and expansion of the Slavs constitute a brilliant apologia for the Slavic nations. What Šafařík accomplished in the broad field of philology was duplicated in history by his younger Bohemian colleague, Francis Palacký, and these patriotic and scholarly efforts laid the foundations for a renaissance of Bohemian literature and of general Slavic intellectual life. The first models of the new literature were the products of the romantic movement in German letters, but Bohemian authors soon passed on to independent creation, and it was Joseph Kollár who, animated by his contacts at Jena with the literature of Young Germany, composed eloquent sonnets in which he called the scattered Slavs to solidarity and coöperation in the great work which he, as a disciple of Herder, believed was their destiny. In particular, Kollár preached a community of interests with the South Slavs, a principle which, had it been properly appreciated by

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the Austrian authorities, might have had incalculable consequences for the maintenance of their Empire.

The ideals preached by Palacký, who was as great a journalist as he was a historian, were first formulated in political terms just prior to the revolutionary year 1848, which signalized the end of Metternich's regime and the dawn of constitutionalism in Austria. It was thus Palacký who advocated an autonomous Bohemia including all the lands which had formerly belonged to the Bohemian crown, together with as much of Hungary as was populated by Slovaks: the principle, indeed, upon which the Czechoslovak state was subsequently erected. It is significant, moreover, that the German elements in Bohemia were inclined to support the Czechs in their agitation for autonomy. But the federal idea was never realized in Austria-Hungary before the monarchy dissolved in 1918, and Bohemian hopes in this direction were dashed by the Austrian Constitution of 1867, which gave the Hungarians a preferred position, as compared with the Slavs, by establishing the principle of dualism, by making Hungary practically autonomous, and by settling the Magyar domination upon Slovaks and Croats. This loss was to some extent offset by educational concessions to the Czechs, since in the previous twenty years Bohemian national consciousness had consolidated to an extraordinary degree through the increased use of the native language and the improved status of both peasants and the middle class. The romantic emphasis laid by Palacký on the glorious past of Bohemia thus proved an altogether healthy spur to the national ambition.

Though after 1867 there was never any real reconciliation between Prague and Vienna, the material prosperity of Bohemia advanced rapidly in the next fifty years, and the part still played by the German element in Bohemia before the war of 1914 is evidenced by the fact that, though they comprised only 37 per cent of the population, they paid 50 per cent of the taxes. But while the Czechs never lost sight of the federalist ideal, this principle was looked on with disfavor by the Viennese

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autocrats, who felt that any increase in Bohemia's degree of independence would only weaken the whole structure of the unified Austro-Hungarian state. This difference in political philosophy was aggravated by the fact that there was too little will to compromise and too much reverence for history among the Bohemian leaders. Oppressed nations always overestimate the practical importance of past tradition. The dominant position long occupied by the kingdom of Bohemia in the Holy Roman Empire, if the Czechs had only realized it, was of far less moment than any rational compromise which would have permitted Bohemia to enjoy to the full the material advantages it commanded as the most highly industrialized section of Austria-Hungary and, at the same time, to cultivate a national spirit, language and literature, without making itself obnoxious to its neighbors by always harping on the same string. It is, however, an unfortunate truth that the composition, within a state, of quarrels rising from linguistic differences complicated by racial, temperamental, and confessional motives and by the carefully cherished traditions of the past which are, or suppose themselves to be, oppressed, is a problem of baffling complexity. On the other hand, the experience of the twenty years before 1939 definitely showed that this problem is not solved by merely setting up these disaffected areas as national units.

Now while it is true that the Czechs did not find themselves precisely in clover under the Hapsburg monarchy, the fact remains that they achieved a high level of material prosperity and culture during the nineteenth century. They had, to be sure, advanced further along the path of social evolution than the Poles, among whom the middle class had actually contracted when the partitions interrupted the evolution of the nation. When Poland fell there were virtually but two classes in the country, the landowning gentry and the peasants. Serfdom was abolished in the Prussian section in 1821, with a subsequent rapid economic improvement in the peasants' status. After the partitions, the middle class evolved most speedily in the Russian section, and at a slower rate under the German régime.

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in the Russian section, and at a slower rate under the German regime. After 1867, the Poles under Austrian sovereignty enjoyed the greatest relative degree of freedom. The local administration passed entirely into Polish hands, the universities of Cracow and Lemberg were Polonized, and Polish was admitted as the official language everywhere except in the military and the postal services. In the Prussian area, the German administration adopted a liberal policy until 1830, when German became the official language, though the local church and the school system remained Polish.

Before 1848, however, pan-Slavic ideals filtered in from Bohemia, and that year saw open revolt in the Posen area. As the middle class grew in numbers, the influence of the nobility waned, and improved educational facilities favored the dissemination of Polish culture and national ideals among the masses. As industry grew in western Germany, there was also a considerable emigration of German residents from the Polish province. German authorities estimate that this movement shifted some three million Germans out of this area during the last half of the nineteenth century. Their places in the cities, which had hitherto been predominantly German, were taken by Polish workers who came in from the country, with the result that the proportion of German population in the Polish cities under German rule declined. At the same time, the general prosperity of Germany benefited the Polish district, the wealth and productivity of which were greatly enhanced during the nineteenth century, and educational opportunities naturally far surpassed those available in either Russian Poland or Galicia.

This survey of relations between German and Slav from the earliest times to the last century demonstrates with reasonable clarity that once the barbarities of the medieval German expansion period were over, every advance in civilization which the Germans experienced was passed on to such of the Western Slavs as were ripe to receive it. Though the Bohemians lost their political independence in the sixteenth century, they had already acquired such a high degree of culture that they were

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The material and intellectual contributions of German settlers in Bohemia and Poland, not only during the later Middle Ages but also in more recent times, were a vital factor in the progress of Western Slavic civilization. The very ideals of nationality which inspired modern agitation for the revival of Western Slavic national states sprang from the brains of German philosophers and political theorists. Even the basic concepts on which the dictatorship of the proletariat was erected in the Soviet Union stem from the theories of the son of a converted Jewish family in the Rhineland who was steeped in the philosophy of Hegel. After the kingdom of Bohemia became subject to the Hapsburgs in the sixteenth century, and after the partitions of Poland brought sections of the former kingdom under Austrian and Prussian sovereignty, the dominance of German influence in these areas was still more firmly established, and there can be no question that the Western Slavs, even under alien rule, participated fully in the advance of Western civilization with which they were in close and lasting contact.

Nationalist aspirations, as we have seen, developed during the first half of the nineteenth century and, while most keenly shared by the Western Slavs, were also transmitted to their South Slavic brethren by the Serbian and Bulgarian students who studied abroad. These aspirations were natural and logical. On the other hand, there was a marked tendency among the Western Slavs to minimize the economic security they enjoyed as members of larger states and to exaggerate the cogency of such traditions of national independence as they possessed. Their nationalistic sentiments were also stimulated both by the spectacle of the difficulties endured by their kindred under Russian rule and by the assumption of superiority by their German masters. There is no question but that the life of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy would have been prolonged had the constitution of 1867 been so modified as to grant its Slavic elements a degree of autonomy comparable to that possessed by German Austrians and by Magyars, since the Bohemians never secured equal political rights in Austria,

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while the Slovaks and the Croats were under an obstinately nationalistic Hungarian control. The Austrian opposition to legitimate Serbian economic aims also intensified Serbian agitation among the Southern Slavs within the monarchy, while the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 was a direct challenge to Serbian national sentiment, and tended to make of Serbia a Russian pawn in the game of international politics—a situation the more dangerous because Bulgaria fell increasingly under the sway of German and Austrian diplomacy.

The interplay of foreign diplomatic influences in the Balkans was interrupted by the World War of 1914, and at its close interest naturally concentrated upon Central Europe where the French, with British support, were engaged in erecting a protective cordon of minor states around Germany. It is worth remarking that in 1914 Bohemian ambitions had not extended beyond vague hopes of eventual autonomy within a federalized monarchy, while the utopia of independence was conceived mainly in the minds of émigré leaders like Professor Masaryk and Dr. Beneš. It was not until 1917 that the domestic Bohemian attitude became definitely revolutionary, and Slovak sympathy was not finally secured until May, 1918, through the celebrated Treaty of Pittsburgh, which guaranteed the Slovaks a degree of autonomy which they never attained until just before the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered by Hitler. As a matter of fact, the relations between Czechs and Slovaks were never so dovelike as Bohemian statesmen would have had us suppose, and at the Armistice, Czech troops had simply marched in and occupied the Slovak section of Hungary.

We now know enough of medieval Slavic history to realize why the process by which the Bohemian border areas were opened to medieval German settlement rendered dangerous in 1919 any boundary adjustment dictated by a spirit of revenge as a consequence of which these districts, for strategic reasons, were turned over to Czech rule. Eloquent warnings against

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A CENTURY OF A PHANTOM
PANSLAVISM AND THE WESTERN SLAVS

by S. Harrison Thomson

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AMONG the gorgeous phantoms of history, none has had a more rich or variously enticing story than Panslavism. It may well be that more literate Europeans have enjoyed the thrill of frightening themselves by it and more designing political manipulators have used it as a stage illusion than would be true of any other fiction. On the other hand there have been published several serious histories of the spectre.

By 1848 Panslavism was already an old and ripe story. To go back to the empire of Samo in the early seventh century is perhaps to be too inventive, but we can certainly trace the idea of Slavic reciprocity in the plans of Boleslaw Chrobry (the Hardy) of Poland, who, around the year 1000, planned a western Slavic empire comprising the Poles, the Czechs, the Moravians, the Elbian Slavs and the western Ukrainians. His obvious purpose was to block further German expansion eastward.[1] Whatever their motivation, those grandiose plans proved ephemeral, as did others conceived by Polish or Czech rulers for centuries thereafter. There is no discernible difference, so far as we can judge, between the territorial and dynastic maneuvering that went on among Slavic princes and that of Austrian, Hungarian and Wallachian rulers in these centuries of the formation of national states. One Slavic people was as likely to be antipathetic to a neighboring Slavic people as to a neighbor who was Germanic or Turco-Ugric. Territorial nationalism or dynastic combination were already the prevailing patterns.

But from the seventeenth century on concepts of a common ethnic and linguistic background begin to grow and take shape. From the Croat Juraj Križanić in the seventeenth century,[2] who spent fifteen years in Siberian exile after proclaiming his Panslav ideas in Russia, to the great Slovak poet, Jan Kollár, in the early nineteenth century, we can trace an unwavering line of western Slavic intellectuals who formulated and reformulated the idea of a glorious Slav race which should of right be united in heart and body, preferably under one paternal Slav ruler.

Somewhat ironically a Baltic German, Johann Gottfried Herder, had contributed much to the most recent upsurge of this Slav feeling by glori-

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1 On whom the classic study is St. Zakrzewski, *Boleslaw Chrobry Wielki* (Cracow, 1925); and cf. more recently, Z. Wojciechowski, "Boleslaw Chrobry i kryzys stosunków polskoniemieckich" in *Przegląd Zachodni* IV (1948), 369-383.

2 Smurlo, E., "From Križanić to the Slavophiles," *Slavonic Review* VI (1928), 321-333; of A. Fischel, *Der Panslavismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919), p. 20ff.; P. G. Scalardi, *Križanich, messager de l'unité des chrétiens et ère du panslavisme* (Paris, 1947).

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fying the Slavic race and treating it as one, from the Moldau to the Urals. He would doubtless have been disturbed to be credited with partial parenthood of both Pangermanism and Panslavism. Early in the nineteenth century most western Slavs were of necessity romantics. Romanticism was the only recourse left them: Poland tragically partitioned, the Slavs of the Austrian Empire barely existing under Metternich, the South Slavs predominantly under the Ottoman Turk. Any voice even faintly suggesting a prouder past, and by implication a comparable future, would be welcome. Their history was their refuge and their hope in time of troubled humiliation.[3]

Philology, poetry and letters, history and the trend of international events in the forties of the nineteenth century all combined to deepen and broaden the feelings but dimly and sporadically aroused a half century before by the wildfire spread of the ideas of the French Revolution. There was now, after decades of scholarship, scientific and historical ground for the concept of Slavic community. The ferment of the Slav Revival, however, romantic it may have been in a technical sense, was a psychological fact of great moment to all the western Slavs, whether living under Magyar repression in Slovakia or Croatia, clumsy Austrian Biedermeier in Bohemia, or awkward Hapsburg pampering in Galicia. The springs of hope and confidence were filling. The single great Slavic state to the east—Mother Russia—was still victoriously radiant from defeating Napoleon, and her very glamor drew irresistibly the yearnings of the Slavic millions enslaved by alien peoples. In many quarters among the western Slavs there was talk of the all-Slavic Tsar, while in Russia there was not infrequently an expression of interest among scholars and publicists as well as among reflective politicians in the possibility of strengthening the natural bonds between Mother Russia and her temporarily estranged children in the west. Pushkin's lines, written after the Polish revolution of 1830-31

> Will the Slavic rivulets pour into the Russian sea,
> Or will it dry up? That is the question.

reflected current Russian thought.[4] A. S. Chomyakov, the Slavophil poet,

[3] See the illuminating discussion of Panslavism by Wacław Lednicki in *European Ideologies* (New York, 1948), pp. 808-951, particularly rich in literary background. His earlier study, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 128-140, 649-662, can also be consulted with great profit. It is significant that this study of Polish Slavophilism ends about the middle of the nineteenth century. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej w okresie przebiorowym*, I (Lwów, 1913) *passim*. For the echoes of this current of thought in Polish literature, and an explanation of how and why it took a line divergent from that in othe. Western and Southern Slavic countries see Zofja Klemerowna, *Słowianofilstwo w literaturze polskiej lat 1800 do 1848* (Warszawa, 1926), *passim*.

[4] See Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 168ff., and Lednicki *passim*. The literature on Russian

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in the next year spoke dramatically of "the brothers in fetters, who wait yearningly for thy call and thy protective embrace." There was much more, a good deal of it more effusive, and all of it tinged with theology, from poets, essayists and even historians, but mostly urging the western Slavs, and particularly the Poles, to recognise their divinely appointed lot as part of a great Slavic nation, naturally under Russian leadership. The Slovak Kollár's "On Slavic Reciprocity" was first published in German in 1837, then appeared in Russian in 1838 and a second time in 1840, but the concept of reciprocity was interpreted by the Russian editor and Russian readers in a Russian sense.[5] It would be difficult to determine whether the Russian espousal of Slavophilism was more or less enthusiastic than that of the western Slavs in the period before 1848, but it is certain that Russian Slavophilism could, even at this early date, be more properly called Panrussism than Panslavism.

We can indeed thus early discern a fairly clear and perhaps radical split in the aims of those who supported Slavic unity. On the one hand the western Slavs thought in terms of reciprocal aid, comfort and support, implicitly and explicitly favoring the independent existence of the several Slavic peoples. On the other hand the Russian Slavophils, from their proud vantage-point of an independent state existence, regarded the lesser Slavic peoples beyond their borders as strayed, lost or stolen children who should return to the mother's heart and hearth, the mother of course being Russia. Their principal concern, indeed, was that Russia herself should perceive her providential mission to carry on the torch of the true Christian faith which was visibly falling from the hand of the weakening West. It was taken for granted that the errant western and southern Slav brethren would accept the new situation with appreciation and even enthusiasm.

Decades of Romanticism, the European enlightenment followed by three-quarters of a century of Slavic renaissance in philology, poetry, ethnography, history and science, has made the dispersed Slavic peoples very sensible of their similarities and their differences, and eager to grasp and hold their own future. The events of February 1848 in western Europe only precipitated these feelings into action. German nationalism had found its voice in the Frankfurt Parliament. It was only natural that the western Slavs should answer with a Slavic assembly. In April the Slovak Ljúdevit Štur was agitating in Prague for a meeting of representatives of the Slavic

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Slavophilism is tremendous. Of the more recent literature in western languages, see Charles Quénet, *Tchaadaev et les lettres philosophiques* (Paris, 1931); A. Gratieux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939); Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa* (Bern, 1948); and Bernhard Schultze, *Russische Denker* (Vienna, 1950).

[5] Clementis, Vl., *Panslavism Past and Present* (London, 1943), p. 38.

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peoples, and Dr. Fr. Brauner received a letter from Ondrzej Moraczewski in Poznań, dated April 23, inviting the Czechs to initiate a Slavic congress.[6] But the first public suggestion to this effect came from the Croat Ivan Kukuljević in the April 20 issue of the *Narodní Noviny*, and a revised call to meet was published on April 30 in the same paper over the signature of Palacký and 19 other leading Czechs.[7] A public statement was issued on May 5 to "our brothers of the Austrian Empire" inviting them to convene in Prague on May 31, in order "to deliberate on our common interests ... We are resolved to remain faithful to the hereditary house of Habsburg-Lorraine ... and to maintain the integrity and independence of the Empire by all means in our power. We therefore reject all accusations of separatism, of Panslavism, of Russianism, which might be brought against us by ill-intentioned accusers.... Our undertaking is essentially conservative in nature and should in no wise disturb our liberal and justice-loving non-Slavic fellow-citizens." This was the voice of Austro-Slavism.

Of the 340 participants, 237 were Czechs and Slovaks, 42 South Slavs, 60 Poles and Ruthenians, and one Russian. Of the Poles several were from Prussian Poland, and the Russian—Bakunin—did not officially represent Tsarist Russia. The very thought of revolution of any sort was uncongenial to Tsar Nicholas I. The Poles would have preferred to have the Congress declare for a restitution of all of Poland, but there was little support for so revolutionary a concept.[8] The ruling motivation was anti-German and anti-Magyar. It was certainly not pro-Russian. Bakunin, the sole Russian present, a voluble guest, was quite un-Russian in his advocacy of Slavic federation.[9] The enthusiasm was tearful and tremendous, the speeches were moving, the parades, dinners and celebrations were elaborate and mystic. Palacký's speech of June 12, resuming the conclusions of the several commissions, specifically demanded a federalized Empire, with Slavs enjoying equal rights and privileges with the Germans and the

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[6] Tobolka, Zd., *Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby*, I (Prague, 1931), 77.

[7] Published in J.M. Černy, *Boj za právo* I (Prague, 1893), 183 and F. Palacký, *Spisy z oboru politiky* (Prague, 1898), p. 241. See also F. Roubík, *Český rok 1848* (Prague, 1948), p. 199, and K. Kazbunda, *České hnutí roku 1848* (Prague, 1929), p. 182ff.; Albert Pražák, "Slavonic Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks" in *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 141-159.

[8] Batowski, Henryk, *Współpraca słowiańska* (Warsaw, 1946), p. 33. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej* I (Lwów, 1913) 288-291.

[9] *Bakuninovi Zpovědi* (Prague, 1926), p. 72ff.; see also B. P. Hepner, *Bakounine et le panslavisme révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1950), pp. 236-284; and on Bakunin's Panslavism and his participation in the Prague Congress see V. Cejchan, *Bakunin o Čechách* (Prague, 1928), pp. 14-30. It seems quite clear that Bakunin had little or no understanding of the orientation of the Slavs of the Hapsburg monarchy.

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Magyars.[10] This was the last plenary session of the Congress. Tumultuous events in Prague, not directly connected with the Slav Congress, made further meetings impossible, and on June 28 it was adjourned *sine die*.[11] An attempt was made to carry on the work of the Congress through a society bearing the name *Lipa slovanská* (the Slavic linden tree), but it did not survive the reaction that set in the next year. There remained, however, for a few years, one insistently free voice. Karel Havlíček, one of Palacký's adjutants at the Congress, refused to be quiet, and through his journal *Slowan* continued, for the two years he was relatively unsilenced, to defend the rights of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire, and went so far as to warn Vienna: "If they will not allow the lesser Panslavism in Central Europe they should take care lest the greater crash on their necks."[12] This is especially suggestive in view of the fact that Havlíček had but recently returned from a trip to Poland and Russia completely cured of any pro-Russian sentiments.[13] There was no western Slav who spoke more frankly than this in the early 'fifties.

Thus as of 1849, Austro-Slavism had apparently had its day within the Hapsburg Empire, and Tsar Nicholas I, after reading the statements written out by Ivan Aksakov in answer to a police questionnaire, wrote in the margin of Aksakov's plaidoyer two comments: "Under the guise of compassion for the pseudo-persecution of Slavic tribes there is hidden a criminal thought about an uprising against the constituted authority of neighboring and partly allied states and about a general unification, which is expected, not from God's will, but from a revolution, which is perilous to Russia." "Only God can determine what is being prepared in the distant future, but if an accumulation of circumstances would indeed lead to such

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10 Palacký, Fr., *Spisy z oboru politiky*, p. 46ff.

11 Roubík, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

12 Quoted in Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 307f. See Karel Tuma, *Karel Havlíček Borovský* (Prague, 1883) who follows the development of Havlíček's thought in these years with extensive quotations from his letters and editorials. In addition to T. G. Masaryk's classic work, *Karel Havlíček* (Prague, 1896), see the more recent work of Jaromír Bílič, *Karel Havlíček Borovský a slovanstvo* (Prague, 1947), especially pp. 27ff. and 180ff. This latter section is particularly illuminating in its analysis of the changes of attitude Havlíček went through toward the Poles, the Russians and Slavism in general.

13 Jirásek, J., *Rusko a my* II (Prague, 1946), 161f.; Tuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 71ff., 92ff. Havlíček saw no reason to modify his unfavorable opinion of Russia even after the failure of the Congress and the onset of reaction. He wrote in the August 30, 1848 issue of his issue of his *Národní Noviny* (quoted by Tuma, *op. cit.*, p. 234f.): "If Russia were a free constitutional country the Austrian Slavs (in case Austria were to be broken up), could consider a union with their blood brethren like the Germans, the Magyars or the Wallachs. They would then be a part of one of the most honorable, and perhaps leading countries of the world. But Russia is a land of despotism, and the rest of us free Slavs must, unfortunately, consider this our brother as our worst enemy."

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unification, it would be for the peril of Russia."[14] Not only did the Tsar disapprove of Slavophilism, but the presence of Russian armies in Slovakia as allies of Habsburg repression in the same year did not encourage Slavophilism among the western Slavs.

For the better part of a decade, both among the western Slavs and within Russia little is heard of Panslavism or even of Slavophilism. The interest of the Russian intellectuals was taken up, in these years, by the polemics focussed around the question of the relations of the Orthodox to the Roman church. The encyclical of Pius IX to the Eastern Christians set off the sharp dispute.[15] In the Empire the reaction of Bach was severely anti-Slav,[16] and Tsar Nicholas would not hear any talk of Slav federation. But the end of the Crimean war, coinciding with the death of Nicholas I and the end of his absolutism, heralded a change in the Russian attitude toward the lesser Slavic breeds beyond the pale. Russia defeated was more receptive to ideas of Slavic reciprocity than before. But to the western Slavs, for a time at least, the shock of Russia's military vulnerability was a bitter disillusionment.[17] This feeling of despair lasted for a number of years until Austria herself was humbled on the plains of Lombardy. Then hope welled anew. Bach's régime was through and Vienna was a suitor for the support of her Slavic peoples. It is not without interest that at about the same time, 1857 and 1858, a Slavic Benevolent Committee was organized in Moscow,[18] and the Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, gave it his blessing. Its benevolence was preeminently directed toward strengthening cultural and ecclesiastical ties with the southern Slavs, particularly the Bulgars. The Tsarevitch was the patron. The list of the founders of the Committee included all the living Slavophils, of both currents—the romantic Panslavists and those we must henceforth call Panrussians. The significance of the junction of these two currents cannot be missed. This date may in fact be taken as a convenient dividing line between the earlier theoretical, romantic, Muscovite Slavophilism, best represented by the poet Chomyakov, the two Kireyevskys, Samarin and Konstantin Aksakov, and the later political Panslavism which should properly be called Panrussism.[19]

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[14] *Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov v yego pismakh* I, ii (Moscow, 1888), 154-55, 160. I am indebted to Professor Leonid I. Strakhovsky for this quotation.

[15] von Schelting, A., *op. cit.*, p. 147ff.

[16] Denis, Edouard, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche* II (Paris, 1903), 353ff.; Tobolka, *op. cit.*, I, 187ff.

[17] See chapter VI, "Polonia fará da se (1857-1863)" of W. Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilungen (1795-1914)*, (Berlin, 1917). This German work is not identical with the previously noticed Polish work of the same author.

[18] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 367ff.; cf. also B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937), p. 60ff.

[19] Beneš, *Úvahy o Slovanstvu* (Prague, 1947), p. 79ff. C. Oudard, *Tchaadaev* etc., p.

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Theoretical Slavophilism was influenced by poorly understood western thought—Rousseau, Hegel, and Fichte—into paths of unrealistic and unhistorical grotesquerie and then grafted onto Uvarov's threefold motto of nationality, orthodoxy and autocracy.[20]

It is a simple axiom of diplomatic history that a great and powerful state does not interest itself "benevolently" in other and lesser peoples unless it either needs their help or hopes to profit from that "benevolence." The change in the momentum of Russian Slavophilism in the late fifties of the nineteenth century clearly illustrates this axiom. Before 1855 Russia was too strong to need the support or loyalty of the western Slavs, and her leadership reasoned that her strength lay in the centralized autocratic system. As the system was regarded as good *per se* it was proper to support it elsewhere, in Prussia, in the Hapsburg Empire and, with qualifications, even in Turkey. But the Crimean War revealed considerable weaknesses in her state structure, and Vienna's affections had shifted to the enemies of Russia. Under these circumstances help, psychological at least, was welcome. Panslavism, it was obviously reasoned, might actually have its points, particularly since most of the western Slavs were in the Hapsburg Empire anyway, and a little discreet discontent there might pay diplomatic dividends. This period is thus a decisive period in the history of the theatrical property known as Panslavism.[21]

The Benevolent Committee actively wooed the South Slavs with appeals to their Orthodoxy, developing the thesis that West and East were irrevocably separate, that Slav, Eastern and Orthodox were and of right ought to be synonymous with Russia. Then came the January 1863 revolution of the Poles, put down by the butcher Murav'ev with brutal ruthlessness. The Benevolent Slavic Committee was able to convince Russian opinion that it was all the Poles' fault, that their Catholicism blinded them to the truth of their Slavic heritage and made them guilty of the "great betrayal,"[22] but after Murav'ev the western and southern Slavs were farther than ever from accepting the doctrines of Muscovite Slavophilism.[23]

408, would call this movement "the second slavophilism." See also M. Prelog, *Pous Slovanu do Moskvy r. 1867* (Prague, 1931), p. 4.

20 See T. G. Masaryk, *Rusko a Evropa* I (Prague, 1930), 406ff. The English edition, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), was based on the German text which Masaryk revised for the 1930 Czech edition.

21 P. N. Milioukov has a chapter in his *Le Mouvement intellectuel russe* (Paris, 1918) p. 377ff., entitled "La décomposition du slavophilisme" in which his explanation of the processes of Russian thought from *ca.* 1848 to the publication of Danilevsky's *Russland und Europa* is treated mystically. Any resemblance between his discussion and the realities of Russia's changed position in European politics after 1853-56 is not even coincidental.

22 Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

23 Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen*, p. 223ff., and contemporary literature there cited.

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Among the South Slavs a considerable element of enlightened opinion, particularly the younger generation,[24] supported the Polish revolutionaries, and among the leaders there was much openly pro-British and anti-Russian expression. Nevertheless the dominant sentiment, both among Serbs and Croats in the sixties was one of nationalist aspirations and, as between other Slavic peoples, benevolent neutrality.[25]

Palacký remarked in 1863 that "Russian Tsardom was not based on Slavic principles but upon an amalgam of Mongolian and German principles."[26] The fact that European opinion had largely turned against Russia finally came home to many of the Russian Slavophils and a natural desire to repair the damage by allaying the suspicions of non-Russian Slavs soon made its appearance. In line with this feeling the Slavic Committee and the recently founded (1863) Society of Friends of the Natural Sciences projected an Ethnographic Congress to meet in Moscow in the summer of 1867.[27] Invitations were broadcast to learned societies throughout the Slavic world. Between the invitation in 1866 and the following summer several events transpired to give the Congress more potential significance. Austria had lost another war—this time to Prussia—and, within the Empire, the Compromise *(Ausgleich)* which divided the Empire into two parts, Hungary and Austria, had become law. The Slavs of the Empire were thus not only split, but put under their enemies, Magyars and Germans. Their long-standing aspirations for an equal share in a federative Empire were roughly dashed.[28] The outlook was black for the western Slavic peoples and it is not surprising that, with the exception of the Poles, the invitations to the Ethnographic Congress at Moscow were eagerly accepted.

In the meantime Ivan Aksakov, enthusiastic over the implications of the visit of so many leading personalities among the western Slavs to the Congress, constituted himself the propagandist of the Exposition, and many editorials in his journal *Den*, beginning with February 1867, concerned the Slav question. He emphasized the bonds between the Russians and other Slavic peoples, and expressed confidence that they had only to know each other to reject foreign, non-Slav control and join forces with

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24 Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

25 Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

26 Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* (Prague, 1872), p. 26, quoting himself in 1863.

27 Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 27ff.

28 Louis Léger recounts the opinion he met on a trip among the South Slavs in 1868, when their participation and hopes in the Moscow Congress were frankly explained to him. See his *La Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), p. 232ff., reprinted from *La revue moderne* of April, 1868.

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their motherland.[29] His line was followed by most of the Moscow journalists.

In Prague the *Národní Noviny*, the organ of the Young Czech party, avowed openly the political aims in the minds of the Czech representatives:

> "We make not effort to conceal the fact that the Moscow Exhibition has for us who are going not only philological or ethnographic interest, but a significance deeply political. We are not responsible for that significance; rather those who have inaugurated dualism in Austria and have endangered the independence of the Czech crown and even of the Czech people... those who have turned the Slovak nation over to the mercies of the Magyars, those finally who are recklessly sacrificing the heroic Croatian people to the greed of the Magyar magnates."[30]

The majority of the Czech delegates, though men of intellectual and often scientific attainments, were yet men active in political life. The delegates of the South Slavs were exclusively non-political. Bishop Strossmayer and Franji Rački, who were especially invited, did not join the delegation, though the Bishop gave the expedition his active support. Ljudevit Gaj, the leading Croat nationalist journalist, went to Moscow, but was unaccountably quiet.[31]

In the realization that the Poles would not be represented, Palacký and Rieger were anxious to show their consideration of Polish sensitiveness and went to Paris to explain their reasons for making the trip when the Poles refused to go. Prince Adam Czartoryski and Andrew Zamojski urged the Czechs not to go, and the son of Adam Mickiewicz wrote them an impassioned letter begging them not to attend the Congress. Another special delegation of representative Polish emigrés waited on them to the same intent.[32]

Opened by the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich on April 23, the Congress was ostensibly an academic and scientific meeting, but railway passes had been given the foreign guests. The western Slavs, on their way to the Congress, crossed the Russian frontier at Granice (i. e. in Polish Silesia) on May 16 and on the 20th reached St. Petersburg.[33] On the way receptions and entertainment were provided by a number of municipalities, though the government took no official action in the matter. Enthusiasm was unbounded. The Czechs and the Serbs were received by Gorchakov

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[29] Aksakov, I. S., *Slavyanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1886), pp. 117-122.

[30] *Národní Noviny*, 1867, no. 11, quoted by Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[31] Fric, J. W., *Die Kehrseite der slavischen Wallfahrt nach Russland* (Prague, 1867), *passim*.

[32] A considerable literature has accumulated on Gaj's trip and activities. See Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff. and literature there cited.

[33] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 68ff.

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in separate audiences and greeted with honeyed and unintelligible words. The Tsar received 20 of the leaders of the various delegations in Tsarskoe Selo on May 26. He is reported to have said to them: "May God hearken soon to all your prayers," a hope which thus relieved the Tsar of any further need for action or hearkening. But he called them his "blood brothers here on native Slav soil" and thereby caused a sensation in western Slav capitals.[84] There were copious banquets and eloquent speeches by learned professors and publicists that left no room for doubt that the messianic hope of close Slavic collaboration was well on the way to realization.[85] They were so busy collaborating that there was barely time to visit the elaborate ethnographic and archeological exhibits for which the Congress had been called. The ghost of absent Poland did discreetly appear at several of the more formal occasions, but it was almost dispelled by confident and urbane diplomacy, which naturally deceived no one. The meeting made a deep impression upon everyone present. The Benevolent Committee was profusely congratulated for its felicitous initiative. But very few felt that much had been accomplished. Gorchakov apologetically stayed aloof, save to opine that the Czechs were apparently working for the King of Prussia. General Peter Suvalov acidly remarked that the pilgrims were pursuing a phantom, and the Austrian minister, Reverters, was told that the Russian court regarded the whole spectacle as foolish.[86] In the western Slavic press reports were, in a slight majority, critical and skeptical. The Moscow Congress may have been the high point in public tribute to the numerous concepts in the center and at the periphery of Slavophilism, but it left much disillusionment in its wake. The Poles were disgruntled at the Czechs for participating against their expressed wishes. The Austrian government had, or affected to have, more than grave doubts of the sincerity of the Czech leaders in their devotion to Austro-Slavism, and even the Catholic clergy saw in the expedition a leaning to Orthodoxy and a defection from Catholicism. Within the Austrian Empire the large Slavic public had lost confidence in the political sagacity of their leaders. There was, of course, after the Congress, not the slightest trace of implementation of all the high-sounding resolutions calling for increased cultural reciprocity between the general Slavic peoples.

About 1870 the vaguely variegated sensitivities and aspirations fo-

[84] Kazbunda, K., *Pouť Čechů do Moskvy 1867 a rakouská diplomacie* (Prague, 1924), p. 63, and M. D. Miličević, Etnografska izložba a slovenska sastanak u Moskvi 1867 (Belgrade, 1884), p. 18ff.

[85] The classically bitter report on the Congress is that by Julian Klaczko, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste" in *Revue des deux mondes* LXI (1867), 132-181. Klaczko, a native of Wilno, had been the editor of the Paris *Wiadomości Polskie*, which ceased publication in 1861. A much more valid short account is that of Louis Léger in *Le Panslavisme et Pantivrit français* (Paris, 1917), pp. 211-249.

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cussing around the two general concepts of Slavism and Russian expansionism began to coalesce and crystallize. In that year there appeared a small book by General Rostislav A. Fadeyev under the title: *Thoughts on the Eastern Question.*[37] It had passed the censor in 1869. Fadeyev, as a soldier, was primarily interested in strengthening Russia's strategic position and in pointing the way to achieving her natural strategic aims—the control of the Straits. To him the Hapsburg Empire was the principal enemy, and not England and France. As the peoples of the polyglot Empire were mostly Slav, Russia should obviously take them under her wing, and eventually head an all-Slav state. This was Panslavism, clearly put, for Russia's political benefit.

A much more radical and thorough treatment appeared by separate chapters in the periodical *Tsarja* in 1869 and, revised, in book form in 1871: Nikolai J. Danilevski's *Russia and Europe.* He was a trained botanist and geographer, and his broad approach covered questions of race, religion, climate, politics, and strategy. Because of its thoroughness and easily comprehensible conclusions, it became immediately the Bible of Panslavism.[38] Danilevski posited a deep-rooted antagonism between West, that is the Latin and the German, Catholicism and Protestantism, commercialism and pointless diversity, and East, that is the Slav, the orthodox and the ordered universal. Russia had a destiny to realize. She should save the smaller and weaker Slavic peoples from the curse of europeanization. The Poles had indeed gone farthest in that sinister direction, hence the great tension between Russia and the Poles. In their case Russia had had to be severe, but it was properly not with their Slavic nature but with its europeanized, Catholic perversion. The Poles should realize that Russia had had to discipline them for their own salvation. To Danilevski Panslavism, so far as it was good, was Panrussism.

It would be difficult to say which of these two works, Fadeyev on the Eastern Question or Danilevski's *Russia and Europe* had the more in-

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36 Revertera, on the other hand, had been instructed by Beust in May to give the whole matter no unnecessary notice. The two governments affected not to count it as of any political significance. See Kazbunda, *Pout' Čechů do Moskvy*, p. 57. Revertera was recalled the next year by Beust and the Tsar told his successor, Albin Vetsera, that he disliked the whole incident and regretted that it had occurred. "Russia is large enough for me; I want nothing from my neighbor" and disavowed any slightest desire to entice away from the Emperor any of his Slav subjects. See Kazbunda, *op. cit.*, p. 121f.

37 English translation by T. Michell (London, 1871), *Opinion on the Eastern Question.* See also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 400ff.

38 German translation by Karl Nötsch (Berlin, 1920), somewhat abridged, *Russland und Europa.* See further Benel, *Uvahy*, pp. 98-107, and the recent study of Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa*, where the focus is on the relation of Danilevski to the church. On p. 238 he calls Danilevski "der eigentliche Systematiker der panslavistischen Weltanschauung."

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fluence. Their arguments were so dynamic in their implications that together they are a landmark in European psycho-political history. Panrussism now had a divinely appointed mission and a program for political implementation.[39] Those whose interests lay in cultural exchange with their western Slav brothers no longer felt unsupported, and those who had before been politically Pan-Russian could not rejoice in the moral support of the intelligentsia. It was a perfect coalescence of ideals and interests. There is no wonder that Gorchakov, the foreign minister, felt very gratified about the jelling of enlightened public opinion. He had shared the distrust felt by the court at cultural Slavophilism, so vocal at the Moscow Congress. It implied equality among the various Slavic peoples. Russian policy would be much happier if Russia's "leadership" and of course "benevolent" hegemony were generally accepted. It is hardly necessary to mention that the acceptance of Russian Orthodoxy—no longer Greek Orthodoxy—was by now assumed as a *sine qua non* of the whole Slavic program. It is not difficult to see how the atmosphere created by the wide circulation of these two sensational books may have convinced Gorchakov and the court that Ignatyev's reports and suggestions from Constantinople correctly represented the proper policy to be pursued—at least in the interests of Russia.[40] We are here far removed from any semblance of the Panslav sentiments of Kollár, or the Austro-Slavism of the Prague Congress of 1848 or even from the implications of Slav cultural reciprocity so fervently expressed by most of the leaders at the Moscow Congress of 1867. We are dealing with realistic political opportunism which makes use of the slogans and stage illusions evoked by romantic or even philosophical Panslavism. Gorchakov and Ignatyev and certainly—and indeed avowedly—Fadeyev, were quite aware of the political semantics fluttering around the words Slavophilism, Panslavism, Slavic solidarity. The fact that the words sent shivers up and down the spines of western diplomats and at the same time thrilled the Russian people and some western Slavs could only please the anti-western party at the Tsar's court.

In 1874 an Archeological Congress was held in Kiev under the auspices of the Moscow Archeological Society. It was sparsely attended by non-Russian Slavs, about a dozen in all, out of a total of 206 delegates. Several unpleasant incidents at this Congress showed that the resentments and tensions between, particularly, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, were

[39] See Lednicki, *art. cit.*, p. 843ff., and Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff. Feldman, *op. cit.*, says bluntly: "Unter den Russen vollzieht sich nach dem Jahre 1870 eine Umwandlung der alten slavophilenBewegung in einen selbstbewussten politischen Imperialismus."

[40] On Ignatyev see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff., and his article in *Slavic Review* XI (1932), 343- , 369-

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deep and lasting. Slavic solidarity was certainly not advanced by this meeting.[41]

It is true that the Bulgarian atrocities precipitated a resurgence, in Russia herself, of the emotional index of the Panslav idea, but basic political realities were not thereby at stake. The participation of Russian soldiers as volunteers in the Serbian army could not obscure the fact that Russia already saw clearly that Turkey was no longer a major antagonist. Indeed the Balkan wars of 1876-78 were only an incident which, if anything, confirmed the political Panslavists (*lege* Pannussians) of the necessity to consolidate their political program and its psychological and moral bases for use in a coming struggle with enemies much stronger than the Ottoman Empire. The Russian campaign of 1877-78 could have been lifted bodily from Fadeyev or Danilevski.

The fact that Gorchakov and Ignatyev had to retire from public life after the Treaty of Berlin has several interesting if not ironic aspects. What must have played a large part in their downfall was the fact that their aggressive Panslavism or Pan-Russism or Russian nationalism had gained less for Russia at Berlin than was popularly expected.[42] Yet they themselves, and here lies the irony, were substantially responsible for inducing Russian opinion to expect so much. The significant fact is the generality of the adoption of the Russian nationalistic thesis, and, in retrospect, the large-scale perversion of the thesis of Slav reciprocity. What, less than a half century before, seen from Paris or London, had been a cloud, small as a man's hand, on the eastern horizon, now seemed a swirling thunderhead, about to loose a torrent and a tempest. This menace bore the label Panslavism. No wonder the west shivered at the word. Yet it was by this time in no sense Panslav but pure Russian expansionism.

It would be of interest to examine the trends of thought among the western Slavs in these years. It was among them that the ideas of Slav reciprocity had first arisen. The great Croat leader, Bishop Strossmayer, had not modified his stand in favor of a South Slav federation and cultural reciprocity with the lands of Orthodoxy. Professor Jaroslav Jagić and George Daničić, the renowned South Slav philologists, both advocated a union of the Croats, Serbs and Bulgars. Nowhere among these leaders do we detect any desire to join a larger Slavic world led by Russia, or any urge to make Orthodoxy the common Slav faith.[43] Their insistence on their cultural and political independence constitutes an emphatic rejection of the

41 Léger, *Le Panslavisme . . .*, pp. 242-249. Léger was present at the Congress.

42 Gorchakov's last years have been frequently discussed. See in brief B. Nolde, *L'Alliance franco-russe* (Paris, 1936), pp. 199ff. and 209ff.

43 Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 347ff.; see also R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911), p. 126ff.

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so-called Panslavism emanating from Moscow in these decades. The fact that, under Magyar rule, any move by South Slavs or Slovaks to cultivate their native language or culture was proceeded against as "Panslavism" and consequently regarded as high treason[44] is obviously irrelevant, because erroneous in its factual bases. Palacký in his *Politisches Vermächtnis* observed that he had come to the conclusion that a Russian universal monarchy would mean "violent compulsion, absolute subjugation and enslavement of all civilized Europe, the suppression and suffocation of every free and noble thought and aspiration of the human race." He added that he thought that the enlightened minds of Russia would likewise regard the expansion of Russia westward as a misfortune.[45] He might not have counted Dostoyevski among the enlightened minds of Russia.

The Poles, crushed between Russian and Prussian calculated oppression, sought solace from their dire despair in their own literature and art. It was all that was left them. Memories of the Russian soldiery of Muraviev certainly estopped any warmth of feeling toward the Slavs they knew the most about from personal experience.[46] The less they had to do with the Russians the better. Orthodoxy was Russian and therefore they clung to their Roman Catholicism with deepening gratitude. The Poles were grateful also to Austria for the relative freedom they enjoyed in Cracow and Galicia, and used it to fortify their nationalism in literature and science.[47]

By the end of the century, whether because of absorption into a more potent and definitely programmatic Russian expansionism, or because its vagaries had repelled the western and more rational Slavs, or because the anti-Panslav campaign from Berlin, Paris and London had been effective, or because Russian imperialism was not too successful, the Panslavism of the Prague Congress of 1848, of the Moscow Slavophils, or the Moscow Congress of 1867 or even of Ignatyev, was dead. It might be more exact to say that the ghost had been laid.

The subsidence of the noble sentiments of Slavic reciprocity, of "interslavism," did not mean, however, that the scarecrow of Panslavism was not still usable. Eduard Beneš recently put these developments in urbane terms:

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[44] *Cf.* the Vakanović memorandum of 1872, quoted by Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis*, p. 13; cf. also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 353f. It would appear that the Magyars were the most consistently fervent believers in Panslavism. At any rate they thought every Slovak was a Panslav. The record contains many instances of such fantasy almost too ludicrous to believe. The most fantastic aspect of this complex is its literal truth. See, e. g. Thomas Capek, *The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism* (New York, 1906), pp. 47-52.

[45] *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

[46] Kucharzewski, Jan, *Origins of Modern Russia* (New York, 1948), p. 349ff.

[47] Chlebowski, Bronislas, *La litterature polonaise au XIXe siecle* (Paris, 1933), chs. XXVIII and XXIX; and see Feldman, *op. cit.*, chapter IX, "Aufleben der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen im Zusammenhange mit modernen sozialen Ideen."

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"Panslavism then, up to 1905, solved no question fully, it failed to attain its aims, and could not be transferred into the field of politics in any concrete form. Finally it became a synonym for Tsarist Russian nationalism and as such, in the form of a political doctrine, could only be prejudicial to all concerned: to the Russians, to the other Slavs, to Europe and to the world. It was harmful to the Slavs because, above and beyond the fact that it was in political fact in great measure a fantasy, it was used and misused against them by their opponents to such an extent that not only the Magyars and the Germans but all of western Europe saw in it a real danger and frequently, because of it, opposed them even where the Slavs were in the right. Against us Czechoslovaks it was for instance used during the first world war and here and there one heard echoes of it even during the second."[48]

The year 1905 brought a marked change, not only in Russia's external prestige and her internal constitutional structure, but also in the attitude of the western and southern Slavs toward the whole question of their own future and the relations between them and Tsarist Russia. Whereas for over a half century, since at least the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848, they had consciously or unconsciously looked to powerful Russia for moral or physical support, now, that Russia had been militarily humbled and they found their own strength growing and their interests in their western connections in a more satisfactory perspective, the prospect of a future independent of Russia was not unpleasing. The vestiges of admiration for Russia that remained clouded but did not basically alter the vision of the future that opened out before them.

As for the Poles, who had never accepted the thesis of Russian leadership, the harsh campaign for russification under Alexander III only increased their hatred of everything Russia stood for and their determination to maintain their separate polonism.[49] Among the Czechs and the Slovaks the "realism" of Masaryk, by which he had meant simply that they should trust in their own moral strength and the logic of national development in order to win out over an already corrupt, artificial and doomed monarchy, had made much headway and was destined to capture the dominant place in the people's thought. The South Slavs had not forgotten the disillusionment brought by the Congress of Berlin and had quickly adjusted themselves to the thesis that they should and could make substantial gains in cultural and political autonomy on their own initiative in the Balkan ambit.[50] The coup of 1903 in Belgrade furthermore opened vistas of actual independence from the Hapsburg monarchy. All the western Slavs had sensed vividly for a full quarter century that Russia had been increasingly

[48] Beneš, *Uvahy o Slovanstvi*, p. 127f.
[49] Cf. M. Zdziechowski, *Wpływy rosyjskie na duszę polską* (Cracow, 1920), p. 53ff.
[50] Cf. E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris, 1920), p. 121ff.

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disinterested, indeed bored, with them and their problems. What fleeting political *rapprochements* took place at top levels did not touch real public opinion save to confirm the general belief that arrangements between dynasts, foreign ministers and such like were cynical and opportunistic. In this case at least it would have been difficult to prove this instinctive judgment erroneous.

On a basis of these psycho-political developments among the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and along her borders the decade between 1905 and the outbreak of the war of 1914 witnessed the rise to dominance of what is usually described as Neo-Slavism.[51] The leading and best known exponent and expositor of this short-lived but significant movement was the Czech politician, Dr. Karel Kramář. The essence of this movement, fundamentally indigenous and unconnected with Russia or the accidental fact that Russia was largely Slavic, was an effort to counterweight Central Europe and the Balkans against the aggressive expansion of Germany in every field of political, economic and social life in that area. Seeing that Austria-Hungary was weakening in the face of the steady pressure from the north, the Neo-Slavs even advocated support of the Empire on condition that it be federalized. If Austria-Hungary could be weaned away from Germany and the Triple Alliance broken up, Russia and Austria-Hungary could draw closer together. Pan-Germanism would then be blocked and the western Slavs could move and have their being in this larger atmosphere. Along these lines there was even, *mirabile dictu*, talk of a Polish-Russian *rapprochement*. Late in 1905 Swiatkowski, an energetic Russian journalist, proclaimed that the German danger made Slavic cooperation absolutely necessary,[52] and he proceeded to beat the drums for a broad-gauged campaign to bring it about—among the Sokols, in the press, by congresses, by cultural and social relations on every level. He envisaged a political union of some sort, but specifically an economic and customs union to which the non-Slavic states of Central Europe should also be invited. In the next two years the idea grew that it was time for all the Slavs to get together again, as in 1848 and 1867, to further their mutual interests. The leader of the movement in Russia was Lt. Gen. Volodimirov, whose recent retirement left him with time on his hands. He enlisted some publicists and men of letters of a poetic cast of mind, travelled to Warsaw, Cracow and Prague, where he found other optimists.

The second Slavic Congress of Prague, which met in July, 1908, was the result of this agitation. It was attended by representatives of most, though

[51] Bonsal, *op. cit.*, p. 134ff. The most complete discussion of this movement is the collaborative work, *Slovanstvo. Obraz jeho minulosti a přítomnosti* (Prague, 1912), with a foreword by Dr. Kramář.

[52] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 307f.

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not all, of the Slavic peoples in Russia, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkans.[53] The slogans were unity, solidarity, reciprocity, equality and unification, though few if any of the delegates knew precisely what they meant. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Polish delegation, ostentatiously shook hands with Krasowski, the head of the Russian delegation,[54] and the whole Congress echoed for days with the miracle that had been wrought. It all sounded like the ominous approach of peace and good will. But the fact is that the whole idea behind the Congress was based on a completely untenable assumption: that the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary did not conflict.[55] It can only be charitably said that the organizers of the Congress had, in a greater degree and with even less excuse than their predecessors of 1848 and 1867, failed to think through their program, its logic and its practicability. Questions which the literate man on the street in Prague, Belgrade or Warsaw knew had to be faced either did not appear on the agenda or were greeted by bland smiles and silence. Two further facts highlight the absurdity of the meeting. The old Panrussians, now benignly veneered with liberalism, were in control of the Russian delegation and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that all their vocal support of the new Slavism was utterly cynical. Neo-Slavism in general and the Prague Congress in particular never aroused any enthusiasm among the Serbs. Roman Dmowski told Beneš in 1917 that his aims at the Congress of 1908 were solely the independence of Poland, and in no sense Slav.[56]

The roseate aura of Slavic amity and hope engendered by the Congress lasted less than three months. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hopes of the western Slavs for an acceptable *modus vivendi* within the then political framework were rudely dashed. The next year it became evident that the promises made to the Poles in Russia in 1905 of modest recognition of their nationalistic feelings were valueless and that reaction was again in the saddle in St. Petersburg.[57]

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[53] Léger, *Le Panslavisme* . . ., p. 271ff.; Beneš, *op. cit.*, 139ff. A rich source of documentation is the printed (but not published) record of the trial of Kramář, Alois Rašín, V. Červinka and Josef Zamazal, which went on from Dec. 6, 1915, to June 3, 1916. Letters, documents and testimony of all sorts on the whole movement, including the various congresses, are printed *in extenso*. See further Paul Milyukov, "World War and Slavonic Policy" in *Slavonic Review* VI (1927-28), 268-290, particularly interesting in its critique of Kramář's ideas and Beneš' opposition to them.

[54] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 149. Dmowski published this same year his *Niemcy, Rosja i Kwestja Polska* (Lwów) in which he argued that Poland's principal enemy was Germany and that it was to the interest of the Poles and the other western Slavs to support Russia.

[55] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 155f.

[56] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 154f.

[57] One of the resolutions passed at the Prague congress to which most weight was

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Yet there were still pleasantly optimistic souls among the Slavic intellectuals. Another Congress was called for Sofia in 1910. It makes even more fantastic reading than those that preceded it. Dr. Kramář was frequently eloquent. No Pole was present as a delegate. The Russian delegation was almost exclusively conservative. No Ukrainian representative came and the Bulgarian Tsar was ostentatiously absent from Sofia during the Congress. This was the last Slavic Congress before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.[58] Almost everybody save the leading Czech slavophil Dr. Kramář left Sofia fully aware that he had witnessed the *rigor mortis* of an ailing phantom—indeed a cooling thought. The Neo-Slav movement had had a short life and an inglorious end. If it accomplished anything it proved that Slavism as a gospel, so long at least as there was an Austro-Hungarian Empire, had insufficient grounding in the tissues of international relations to have the slightest influence upon the trend of events in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is a commonplace among German historians and analysts of the origins of the first world war that it was essentially a defensive struggle by Germandom against Slavdom. Bethmann-Hollweg made the statement early, and so weighty a study as Fischel's *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* is avowedly devoted to this thesis. But it will hardly bear careful examination. There were Germans on one side—there was a majority of Slavs on the other. But that is more accidental than essential. Along with many Slavic-German issues there was in fact a greater number of issues completely unrelated to the Slavic-German question which in the inevitable logic of history would have had to be decided completely regardless of ethnics and culture. After the war, out of which arose three new or revised west Slavic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the principal inter-Slav questions were solved and there was hardly a whisper of Panslavism. Bolshevik Russia, emphasizing its multinationality and its supranational foundations, in the early years at least, had no interest in Slavic countries *per se*, and Panslavism, Slavophilism, Neo-Slavism and even Pan-Russism became historical curiosities, objects of antiquarian research.

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attached was to the effect that St. Petersburg should be the meeting place of the next Pan-Slav conference the following year. Léger (*op. cit.*, p. 278) says: "l'on se sépara en se donnant rendez-vous pour l'année suivante à St. Petersbourg. Ce rendez-vous ne devait pas se réaliser." S. B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1929), 401, and B. E. Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 248, mention the congress in the summer of 1909 and the circular letter sent to Slav organizations in the Balkans. The contradiction is only apparent. There was such a conference and such a secret circular, but very few South Slavs attended the meeting. See dispatch from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (German chargé d'affaires in Vienna) to Bethmann-Hollweg of July 25, 1909, in *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, 844f.

[58] See the *Kramář-Prozess*, pp. 402-407, for interesting sidelights on the meeting.

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This should cause no surprise. Whenever in the past these national groups had existed as independent states there had not been any discernible urge for exceptional collaboration on a basis of their consanguinity. They had pursued their particular needs, in the same way as France, Italy and Spain, also related by history, language, religion and ethnic bonds, had, throughout their history, tended toward particularism and strenuously rejected any centripetal pressures. It would seem reasonable to allow Slavic peoples to act according to a pattern assumed to be rational and even enlightened farther west.

The Little Entente was, quite accidentally, two-thirds Slav. Its collapse was precipitated by the early defection of Yugoslavia, one of the Slav thirds. The Balkan Entente followed no noticeable Slavic pattern.

The aggressive war of 1939 was variously advertised. It was directed against any people that objected to being nazified, Slav, Teuton, Baltic or Latin. The fourth partition of Poland, shared in equally by Russia and Germany, made it abundantly clear that it was not a war against Bolshevism or of German against Slav. It would have been difficult to arouse among western Slavs any enthusiasm for the Slav idea from August 23, 1939 to June 22, 1941.

At this point it is possible to draw some deductions from the history of the variations in Slav feeling. The sense of Slavic community weakened, or perhaps more accurately shuffled into the unrealistic or academic empyrean, in times of peace. Under stress and strain or in times of crisis Slavophilism became again, with the limitations of the moment, an active force.[59] But all wars, the ultimate in national interest, have acted as rapid solvents of these fond dreams. This failure of the idea to stand any real test will explain why we use the term phantom or illusion of the whole concept.

From 1941 on one heard much of Slavic solidarity. There were All-Slav congresses at Moscow in August 1941, April 1942 and May 1943. The Russian speakers emphatically repudiated the political Panslavism and Pan-Russism of the nineteenth century and appealed "for the union of all Slav strength in the struggle against Hitlerism."[60] There was to be a unity of equals with equals, all bound together in a happy family of democratic peoples. Thereafter Slavic committees sprang up and Slavic congresses were held in London, Detroit and Pittsburgh, and in 1945 and following years, in Sofia, Belgrade, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw. The themes of all these meetings followed the same lines: rejoicing in new Slav unity

[59] Cf. A. Mousset, *Le Monde Slave* (2nd. ed., Paris, 1947), p. 385.

[60] Vl. Osmania, Secretary of All Slav Committee, in May, 1943, quoted by Mousset *op. cit.*

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under the leadership of Soviet Russia. Whereas the pre-1914 congresses were usually gatherings of professors and publicists, and the realist politicians generally abstained, the post-1941 gatherings were almost exclusively made up of politicians and poets. The trained professorate was in a noticeable minority. It would perhaps be superfluous to quote many of these political leaders on the subject of Slav unity, but it would not be difficult to discover a marvelous, perhaps inspired, unanimity.

There were numerous speeches in all the western Slav capitals which emphasized "the Slavic bloc, directed by the great Russian people"[61] "for the protection of their freedom and democracy."[62] There is no room for question as to what was meant. The signing of every new treaty, of commerce, mutual defense or cultural friendship, was accompanied by headlines, radio propaganda and ministerial banquets, in all of which inter-Slavic devotion was lauded with profound conviction. Ceremonial visits of chiefs of state were exchanged, there were many elaborate parades and happy reunions. In between, naturally, there were visits to Moscow. M. Georgiev, the Bulgarian President, remarked, on landing in Moscow on Jan. 7, 1946: "I am happy to be in the fortress of the Slavic peoples which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of all democratic humanity." M. Vishinsky then visited Sofia.

The years 1946 and 1947 brought electoral and diplomatic victories to Russia. As all the Slavs were now safely enjoying their Slavic solidarity, it was no longer necessary to emphasize Slavism. Marxian Socialism was a more comprehensive concept into which Magyars, Rumanians, Austrians, Germans and Balts could conveniently be made to fit. We have therefore to remark upon the relative silence of western Slavic spokesmen on the subject of Slavic solidarity in the years 1947 and 1948. That stage illusion was no longer necessary, at least in so urgent a fashion, as before. On the other hand it would be incorrect to say that it had been completely withdrawn from circulation. The enforcement of Russian language instruction in the schools, the extended tours of Russian artists, authors, scientists and athletes throughout all the Slavic countries, the dominant place in areas of cultural expression, education, science, press, radio, screen and stage, given to the products of Russia, all reveal the underlying plan. It should not be overlooked, furthermore, that the Orthodox Church has, with the support of the Kremlin, been incorporated into the program of implementation of the plan with considerable success in at least Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine. Whereas under Tsarist rule the trilogy of

[61] Quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 257, from Zdenĕk Nejedlý, Czechoslovak Minister of Education.

[62] Nikolov, President of Slav Committee, at Sofia, quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 262f.

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175 186 829 668 nationalism, orthodoxy and autocracy was the slogan reserved for Russia herself, one is justified in remarking that Russian nationalism has now become Slavic nationalism or Slavic unity, Orthodoxy is being encouraged outside Russia, and of autocracy throughout the western Slavic states there appears to be quite adequate evidence. We have, on the other hand, little positive proof that thus far the various Slavic peoples love each other more than they did, say in 1860, 1890 or 1935. Titoism rather speaks for itself, and the great popularity of Gomulka in Poland would indicate, if there were any need, the continuity of Polish separatism from time immemorial. A thousand years of determined and consistent western orientation and nationalism are not obliterated in a decade of government by loud speakers, force and fear.

As we look back over the last century of Slav thought, interaction and political mutuality, several broad lines of change strike our notice. In 1848 Slavophil enthusiasm stemmed mostly from within the polyglot Hapsburg monarchy. A century later, not only has this Empire, officially a bulwark of Germanism with all its westward leanings, disappeared, but its place and much more has been taken by the heirs of the Tsars. In 1848 Slavic thought was largely centered on cultural and moral reciprocity. A century later the Slavic nations, under the direction of Russia (excepting, for the moment, Yugoslavia), constitute a solid and ruthlessly integrated political, economic and military unity, more tightly welded with each passing day. But nothing seemed more sure, and indeed necessary, in 1848 than the Hapsburg Empire. Yet that imperial idea was in actuality soon after 1848 rejected by those who had theretofore felt it to be necessary. Under similar circumstances there is every reason to think that the present, stronger than imperial, concept will be rejected. Of their own volition the western Slavs have never in their long history shown any general desire to become part of an inclusive Slav empire. They have at various times experienced the imperial idea only to repudiate it. Nor, in spite of present conditions, is there any evidence that the people of these nations have lost their historic particularism. All the verifiable evidence is in the opposite direction. These peoples have lived long and are wise from bitter experience, a teacher whose lessons last longer than those of ministers of propaganda. Nowhere is the common man more anxious to claim citizenship of the world than in Central Europe, where the western Slavs for much more than this past century have been exposed to the repeated appearances of, only to reject, the phantom of Panslavism.

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[For information on the development of Panslavism, see cat. 116, entire source.]

[For data on panslavism and slavophilism see category 116.]